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Article
The Rise and Fall and Rise Again of Informal Justice
and the Death of ADR
AMY J. COHEN
Today, the field of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is often conceptualized
and taught as an apolitical, institutional practice designed to enhance the effective
and efficient settlement of legal disputes. But this was not always the case. In the
1970s, scholars imagined mediation as a technique of social and political
transformation: a practice that might enable people to resolve disputes without
reproducing the inequalities that shaped the society in which they lived. That view
of ADR has largely disappeared from the American legal academy. But, as this
Article shows, it has not disappeared entirely. Outside the legal academy, prison
and police abolitionists are turning to the tools of dispute resolution as an important
mechanism of social change. This Article embeds today’s movement for
transformative justice in a longer genealogy of informal justice, and it revitalizes a
sociolegal perspective that uses micro-level conflict as a critical framework through
which to analyze macro-level transformations. The Article ventures that this
sociolegal perspective can help respond to the disciplinary crisis that currently
faces the field of ADR in American legal education, revealing ADR as a powerful
tool for thinking through both the mechanisms and the difficulties of emancipating
social and political change.
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The Rise and Fall and Rise Again of Informal Justice
and the Death of ADR
AMY J. COHEN *
INTRODUCTION
In 2002, immediately after graduating from law school, I spent a year in
Nepal engaged with projects advancing community mediation. I encountered
an organization called the Centre for Victims of Torture (CVICT), which was
formed in the aftermath of Nepal’s 1990 democratic revolution to provide
counseling and other services to victims of state torture. The organization
quickly discovered that it often ended up with clients after police intervention
in local community disputes. It accordingly decided to teach community
mediation techniques to Nepali villagers to preempt the involvement of police
and thus the state violence that frequently followed. As the CVICT director
then told me:
Many of the victims who came here were discussing [the fact]
that the main reason for them to be tortured was when there
were small disputes in the community and one of them went to
the police. . . . So we thought: Can we do something to stop
those people going to the police for a small dispute? . . .
Basically, the idea [for community mediation] came out of
directing people [not] to go to the police . . . . The idea was given
by the torture victims themselves. . . . [T]his component—[the]
prevention [of police] torture component—is very strong.1
My fin de siècle training in Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) at
Harvard Law School, the law school that pioneered ADR as a field in legal
education, did not once suggest that mediation might be a useful means of
protecting communities from state violence. Nor did I have any inkling at
the time that what someone was saying halfway around the world in Nepal
*

Amy J. Cohen, Robert J. Reinstein Chair in Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law and
Professor, UNSW Sydney Faculty of Law & Justice. For conversations and critical comments, I thank
Amna Akbar, Hiro Aragaki, Jane Baron, Mathew Canfield, Thomas Crocker, Deval Desai, Noam Ebner,
Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Ilana Gershon, Daniel Del Gobbo, Janet Halley, Eve Hanan, Nicolás
Parra Herrera, Fleur Johns, Adriaan Lanni, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Martha Minow, Bronwen Morgan,
Aparna Polavarapu, Rachel Rebouché, Brishen Rogers, Marc Spindelman, Nancy Welsh, Mo Zhang, and
especially Genevieve Lakier who, two decades ago, joined me to observe CVICT mediations.
1
Amy J. Cohen, Debating the Globalization of U.S. Mediation: Politics, Power, and Practice in
Nepal, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 295, 324 n.100 (2006) [hereinafter Cohen, Globalization].
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during a Maoist insurgency was exactly what organizers in the Movement
for Black Lives would be saying in the United States nearly twenty years
later. I was unprepared for CVICT mediation trainings that began with
Nepali facilitators lighting candles for “martyrs of democracy” and victims
of police abuse.2 And for mediation trainings that encouraged women to
combine into “pressure groups” so that they could attempt collectively to
hold abusers in their villages to account without turning to law enforcement.3
ADR scholars were equally unprepared. When I came home and
described these observations, many of my ADR colleagues could not believe
that what CVICT was doing was, in fact, mediation. As Jean Sternlight
explained, “some would disagree that the [CVICT] dispute resolution tool . . .
was appropriately labeled ‘mediation.’”4 This was because, she elaborated, the
CVICT tool “‘is often public and coercive,’ and purposely enunciates the
political demands of members of the society.”5 As such, it disrespects liberal
principles of mediator neutrality and party self-determination. These are
principles that mean disputants may consent to any agreement they wish, free
from third party or community impositions—and that today largely define
mediation within the field of American ADR.
Yet in the broader history of dispute processing scholarship, it is
relatively surprising that by the early 2000s, a dispute resolution practice
organized around a normative and political critique of the state—and that
otherwise involved third parties intervening in interpersonal conflict without
the authority to issue binding decisions—appeared to ADR scholars as
something other than mediation. For it was only a few decades earlier that
the study of informal dispute processing had produced a spate of critical
political and analytical questions that were simpatico with the questions my
Nepali interlocutors wrestled with. For example: How could analysts study
dispute resolution without a theory of society in which disputes play only a
particular part?6 Could left social movements use mediation to translate
political aims into individually felt grievances and then link these grievances
back to demands for collective self-determination?7 And, as mediation
becomes part of public governance, could analysts “see” how state power

2

Id. at 297.
Id. at 341–44.
4
Jean R. Sternlight, Is Alternative Dispute Resolution Consistent with the Rule of Law? Lessons
from Abroad, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 569, 579 n.56 (2007).
5
Id. (quoting Cohen, Globalization, supra note 1, at 298).
6
See, e.g., Maureen Cain & Kalman Kulcsar, Thinking Disputes: An Essay on the Origins of the
Dispute Industry, 16 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 375 (1981–82).
7
See, e.g., Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Law and Community: The Changing Nature of State
Power, in 1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 249, 264 (Richard L.
Abel ed., 1982); Roger Mathews, Reassessing Informal Justice, in INFORMAL JUSTICE? 1, 19 (Roger
Mathews ed., 1988).
3
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was changing by studying everyday dispute processing? Answers to these
and similar questions, by their nature, could scarcely hinge upon formal
process definitions.
This Article recounts some of the discipline’s transformation from the
1970s until now. It traces how, as ADR became a field in American legal
education, complex sociolegal and political questions faded from its
thinking, and it argues that it is time to revitalize the field by bringing these
sociolegal and political questions again to the front and center. In recent
years, the field has been marked by a pervasive sense of crisis. In blog posts,
conferences, and papers, a range of scholars have argued that ADR is now
dying, not as a set of practices or institutions, to be sure, but as an entrenched
scholarly field of legal education. As Deborah Thompson Eisenberg
summarized recently: “[S]ome are concerned, if not downright panicked,
that the future of ADR in the legal academy . . . looks bleak.”9 I argue that
ADR’s march to instrumentalization—that is, its march to develop formal
institutional procedures defined by a specific set of best practices to resolve
conflicts—has left scholars constrained in the political, social, and economic
questions that they can claim to explain why ADR should remain an
important scholarly field in legal education.
But as readers already anticipate, I recall my fieldnotes from Nepal in a
moment when prison and police abolitionist organizers are practicing their
own versions of community mediation as an alternative to police torture and
mass incarceration. Americans now, like Nepalis then, are asking how they
can resolve local disputes and conflicts without turning to the police, in part
because turning to the police risks introducing outsized responses of state
violence. Thus, at the same moment that ADR is losing its status as an
intellectually vibrant field within law, experiments in what is often called
transformative justice or community accountability processes are
proliferating in left-wing American social movement consciousness.
This Article argues that transformative justice renews one of the
normative claims and critical questions that helped originate scholarly interest
in mediation. The claim is this: democratizing control over dispute resolution
is a meaningful part of achieving social transformations. Movements to
achieve deep-structural change should proceed not only at the level of political
and economic systems. They should also confront questions of interpersonal
conflict, harm, and violence—and not least because interpersonal conflict
and harm make people vulnerable to state power through institutions that
8

See, e.g., Susan S. Silbey, On the Relationship of State Theory to Sociolegal Research: The
Example of Minor Disputes Processing, 10 STUDS. L. POL. & SOC’Y 67 (1990) [hereinafter Silbey, Minor
Disputes Processing].
9
Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Beyond Settlement: Reconceptualizing ADR as “Process Strategy”,
in THEORIES OF CHANGE FOR THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MOVEMENT: ACTIONABLE IDEAS TO
REVITALIZE OUR MOVEMENT 53, 53 (John Lande ed., 2020) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Process Strategy].
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advance punishment and the interests of capital. But—and this is the critical
question—efforts to “take back” conflict from the state and professional
adjudicators invariably confront a problem. In any society organized around
inequalities—capitalism, racism, and patriarchy—how can people engage in
informal, democratic practices of dispute resolution in ways that transcend
rather than reproduce these inequalities without defaulting back to formal
legality and state incorporation—the very institutions that compelled people
to search for alternative processes?
This Article proceeds in two parts. In Part I, I describe some of how
American ADR became the field it currently is. I trace its roots in left utopian
politics; to its status as a subject of left critical sociolegal inquiry; to its
establishment as a centrist and programmatic field in legal education as it
became commonsensical for American law schools to devote faculty
resources to ADR scholarship and teaching; to its experience of crisis today.
In Part II, I describe a return to left emancipatory politics among Black
Lives Matter and prison and police abolitionist organizers advancing practices
of nonstate justice. I illustrate how these organizers translate transformative
politics into microsocial practices by teaching skills and designing conflict
intervention processes meant to be egalitarian and radical. The pandemic
meant that I could participate in webinars and Zoom trainings offered virtually
throughout the summer and fall of 2020 by Black, Indigenous, and people of
color (BIPOC) organizers and survivors, many of whom have been practicing
and sharing skills in transformative justice for nearly two decades. These
trainings were offered publicly, in a moment of heightened popular urgency,
given the renewed spate of police violence and killings of BIPOC lives.10
I conclude by explaining why I wish to claim transformative justice as
mediation—even as I know transformative justice organizers themselves do
not adopt this label and, to the contrary, draw functional distinctions among
processes.11 It is because I wish to recover mediation as more than a
specifically defined institutional practice but rather as an open-ended
10

In this Article, I include quotations only from presentations and training available online.
For example, adrienne maree brown teaches that “transformative justice processes, where
someone has caused harm and is being called into accountability, are a different task” than what she calls
kitchen table mediation. “[Transformative justice processes] are usually more intense and deeper
processes than those that a kitchen table mediation can or should hold. They often involve multiple
support people, holding a harm that would otherwise involve the state, and possibly result in prison.”
ADRIENNE MAREE BROWN, HOLDING CHANGE: THE WAY OF EMERGENT STRATEGY FACILITATION AND
MEDIATION 173 n.1 (2021). Likewise, Mariame Kaba and Shira Hassan distinguish between what the
transformative justice movement calls community accountability processes, designed to support people
to take accountability for a harm and meet survivor needs, and mediation. Community accountability
processes are “not the same as mediation” because “[m]ediators do not try to determine what ‘really’
occurred, who is telling the truth or who is at fault.” Instead, the “focus of a mediation session is on the
future: what will happen from now on?” MARIAME KABA & SHIRA HASSAN, FUMBLING TOWARDS
REPAIR: A WORKBOOK FOR COMMUNITY ACCOUNTABILITY FACILITATORS 86 (2019) [hereinafter KABA
& HASSAN, WORKBOOK].
11
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analytical category—one that sits between state adjudication and self-help
or violence and that allows analysts to observe how people navigate and
resist dominant social orders and envisage alternatives to them.12
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMAL JUSTICE AND THE RISE AND
FALL OF ADR
In this Part, I recount the origins and development of the field of American
ADR. But three provisos are in order. First, readers will observe that my
narrative focuses on mediation, rather than on other non-adjudicatory dispute
processes. In a historical moment when reformers were arguing about the
limits of American adjudication, I think it was innovations in mediation that
first enabled legal scholars to develop distinctive identities and claims to
expertise.13 Mediation also anchored field-defining debates about how people
could use extrajudicial processes to participate in democratic self-government
and individual and collective self-determination.
Second, and in this vein, readers will also observe that my description
of mediation disrespects contemporary definitions of it as a neutral process
oriented toward the efficient settlement of typically civil disputes. These
transgressions are purposeful and reflect the Article’s normative ambition:
namely, to wrest the scholarly field of ADR apart from its near-complete
identification with a set of institutional practices that often take place in
courthouses and corporations; the procedural requirements that define these
practices and the ideas and skills that support them; and questions about how
best and how fairly to improve and rationalize them—and return the field to
the realm of social inquiry.
Third, and to that end, in Part II, I ask readers to consider transformative
justice as a kind of mediation in order to argue that the field of ADR need
not be thought of in narrow institutional terms but can once again be
theorized for how it opens up (complex and indeterminate) pathways for
social change. Hence, I must make especially clear at the outset: the stakes
of thinking with transformative justice for ADR are not therefore whether
ADR can “take down the state,” or if this particular normative version of
transformational dispute practices will prove to be liberatory. My offer

12

See Carol J. Greenhouse, Mediation: A Comparative Approach, 20 MAN 90 (1985).
To be sure, by the early 1980s, innovations in the theory and practice of legal negotiation
combined, informed, and reinforced innovations in mediation—together capturing much of what
appeared new and exciting about the modern field. For a twentieth century genealogy of American
negotiation theory (and one grounded in labor struggles), see Amy J. Cohen, A Labor Theory of
Negotiation: From Integration to Value Creation, 1 J.L. & POL. ECON. 147 (2020) [hereinafter Cohen,
Labor Theory]. For a description of early texts and pioneering efforts to introduce negotiation as a course
in legal education, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation: A Study of Strategies in Search of a
Theory, 8 AM. BAR FOUND. RSCH. J. 905 (1983).
13
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instead is an attempt to use practice on the ground to reinject the field with
intellectual vibrancy.
A. The Left Transformative Turn to Informal Justice: 1970s–1980s
In the 1970s, legal reformers interested in questions of criminology
began to ask if informal justice could ameliorate some of the limitations and
pathologies of state justice systems. Here is how Raymond Shonholtz, who
pioneered an early neighborhood justice center,14 described the problem to
American lawmakers:
If you look at low income people, they rarely use the police, and
if they are of a racial background and low income, they very
infrequently use the police. When they do use the police, it’s to
abate a situation and rarely to identify a second party. . . . If you
go into any urban area in the country you will find, in
particularly low income communities, a high incidence of
tolerance, because there is no adequate forum to deal with the
problem. No one will use the existing forum . . . because they
don’t trust it, it does not relate to their needs and it does not, in
fact, give them anything.15
Shonholtz urged policymakers to “look at . . . systems that are not in the
Western World” and to design a new procedure for conflict resolution—one
that is “nonadversarial, nonadjudicatory, conciliation oriented, and
sometimes called mediation.”16
Early proponents of community mediation drew inspiration from legal
anthropologists. Anthropologists had produced numerous studies that made
disputing—not law—the central object of analysis and that treated
rule-based legal systems as but one of many methods for handling social
conflict.17 For reformers, two features of this work appeared particularly
salient. First, anthropologists observed that in many societies, mediation
produced effective forms of social ordering. As Carol Greenhouse recalls,
“[o]ne of the very earliest achievements of legal anthropology was to
demonstrate that societies are capable of normative order in the absence of
14

See Justin R. Corbett, Raymond Shonholtz: Community Mediation Visionary, NAT’L ASS’N FOR
CMTY MEDIATION (Jan. 9, 2012), http://blog.nafcm.org/2012/01/raymond-shonholtz-community-mediat
ion.html [https://perma.cc/HZ4A-XCKJ].
15
Dispute Resolution Act: Hearing on S. 957 Before the Subcomm. on Cts., C.L. & the Admin. of
Just. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 131, 135 (1978) (statement of Raymond Shonholtz,
Program Dir., Cmty Bd. Program, San Francisco, California).
16
Id. at 135–36. In this progressive call for mediation, readers may nevertheless observe some troubling
assumptions: that only some people are marked by a “racial background”; that to see conciliation-oriented
processes, one must look outside the West rather than to Indigenous American legal and political systems. Id.
17
For an excellent summary, see Francis G. Snyder, Anthropology, Dispute Processes and Law: A
Critical Introduction, 8 BRIT. J.L. & SOC’Y 141 (1981).
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laws or formal courts of law.” Second, reformers appreciated the normative
character of this order. Informal mediative practices could popularize and
collectivize conflicts and integrate disputants, whereas formal state law
abstracted, individuated, and separated. What distinguishes “the legal-judicial
approach,” Tony Marshall observed, “from more informal systems studied
by social anthropologists . . . is its alienative character. It is predicated on
separating an ‘offender’ from the rest of society; opposing him/her to the
‘good’ victim or the state . . . and, in sentencing, [on] plac[ing] the whole
blame for what has happened upon the offender . . . .”19
Hence the now largely forgotten point I wish to stress: in the 1970s,
American interest in mediation was motivated, in no small part, by criticisms
of modern penal systems. Let me elaborate this point with one example. In
1973, Richard Danzig published an article in the Stanford Law Review that
posed the following question: “Despite the differences between a tribal
culture and our own, isn’t there a place for a community moot in our judicial
system?”20 Danzig reasoned that overcriminalization and overcentralization
were mutually reinforcing problems, and he argued to decentralize control
over the definition of crime and over law enforcement. Specifically, Danzig
proposed that localities should be able to decide whether to “label
prostitution, gambling, homosexuality, drunkenness, marijuana use,
vagrancy, and disorderly conduct as ‘crimes’” and, if so, with what potential
sanctions.21 Trained community residents could then assume social control
functions. Without the power of arrest, they would respond to “a family
fight, juvenile rowdiness, or . . . drunken vagrancy” according to the
“community’s definition of order.”22 These men would “remove their hats,
sit down, make polite small talk and light a cigarette, and spend thirty
minutes, an hour, or an hour and a half with the disputants, discussing their
problems, moderating antagonisms, and ultimately making referrals to
community welfare agencies or the community moot.”23 Without the power
to compel attendance, the moot would emphasize social bonds among
everyone present rather than impose distance between a judge and litigants.
And rather than focus on legally cognizable issues, the moot would
encourage broad discussion about troubled local social relations.24 And, if
community intervenors and moots failed to produce conciliation or if

18
19

Greenhouse, supra note 12, at 98.
Tony F. Marshall, Out of Court: More or Less Justice?, in INFORMAL JUSTICE?, supra note 7, at

25, 46.
20
Richard Danzig, Toward the Creation of a Complementary, Decentralized System of Criminal
Justice, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1, 43 (1973).
21
Id. at 17 (footnote omitted).
22
Id. at 28.
23
Id. at 34 (footnotes omitted).
24
Id. at 42–43.
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disputants preferred, residents could avail themselves of police, prosecutors,
and the American penal system.25
In the 1970s, Danzig was writing in a moment when civil rights advocates
were decrying the police for their role in conserving the social order. And a
moment when New Left critics of the American penal state shared with early
proponents of community mediation “[a] deep distrust of state power; a
profound cynicism about professional motives; . . . [and] a concern for the
‘self-determination’ and ‘empowerment’ of the poor and minority groups.”26
Influenced by the communitarian movements of the 1960s and 1970s, scholars
and organizers argued that through community mediation “poor people and
minorities [can] increase their influence over the institutions and forces that
shape their lives.”27 Against this backdrop, Danzig described community
control as liberatory. “[A]ll the acts of oppression that must be performed in
this society to keep it running smoothly,” he quoted, “are pushed upon the
police. . . . The police have become the repository of all the illiberal impulses in
this liberal society . . . .”28 He reasoned that by divesting police from low-level
interventions—where they all too easily inject their class sensibilities and
exacerbate conflict—community intervenors could practice order maintenance
in ways that engage and serve local interests.29
Of course, in practice the opposite happened—broken windows
ideology intensified the role of the state in policing low-level infractions.30
But I nevertheless want readers to appreciate the terrain of this debate.
Danzig aimed to relegitimate state institutions by shifting particular social
control functions to communities. For this reason, he was challenged by
scholars who found his proposal not too romantic or impracticable but rather
too anemic. Eric Fisher, for example, faulted Danzig for failing to make the
community moot the exclusive arbiter of the harms in its jurisdiction: “a true
community court should be more than an adjunct to the existing system.”31
Dennis Longmire likewise argued that Danzig’s proposal overly relied on a
25

Id. at 36–37, 48.
DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIETY 56 (2001).
27
PAUL WAHRHAFTIG, COMMUNITY DISPUTE RESOLUTION, EMPOWERMENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE:
THE ORIGINS, HISTORY AND FUTURE OF A MOVEMENT 63 (2004).
28
Danzig, supra note 20, at 28 (quoting PAUL CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER: POLICE ABUSES IN NEW
YORK CITY 280 (1969)).
29
Id. at 28–32.
30
George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety,
ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/.
Kelling and Wilson argued for the aggressive policing of low-level infractions because they reasoned
that “at the community level, disorder and crime are usually inextricably linked, in a kind of
developmental sequence.” Id. For early normative and empirical criticisms, see BERNARD E. HARCOURT,
ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2001).
31
Eric Fisher, Community Courts: An Alternative to Conventional Criminal Adjudication, 24 AM.
U. L. REV. 1253, 1287 (1975).
26
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shadow of state coercion. He wanted a community system that ideally will
“negate the need for coercive social control agencies and will therefore
suffice as a complete replacement for, rather than compliment to, the
existing law enforcement system.”33
Longmire reasoned that a basic principle of radical criminology is to
advance changes in social control alongside changes in political economic
systems.34 Hence, the reason to replace “the bourgeois notion of criminal
justice” with “the ideal of popular justice” is that liberal legality is
subordinated to the logics of capital and therefore constitutes disputants as
individuals destroying collectivity, equity, solidarity.35 Longmire
nevertheless proposed that movements to resolve community conflict based
on people’s own norms and values need not await “the successful overthrow
of capitalism.”36 A regime committed to participatory democracy, he
ventured, could nurture collective dispute resolution institutions that could
progressively dissolve the state criminal system.
In sum, these writers were asking how community mediation could improve
and legitimate—versus undermine and transform—the existing criminal legal
system. Many had specific ambitions for the practice of mediation. Some hoped
that users of community mediation would discover bases of social solidarity,
such as working-class backgrounds and common experiences of subordination,
and that they would use these solidarities to discover how what seem like
individualized conflicts and harms often reflect broader community problems
and therefore require collective action to resolve them.37 Another strand of
advocates, whose work would later coalesce under the banner of restorative
justice, reasoned that through mediation offenders and victims could
experience moral and relational transformations that could likewise catalyze
broader social and political shifts. These scholar-practitioners reasoned that
32

Dennis R. Longmire, A Popular Justice System: A Radical Alternative to the Traditional
Criminal Justice System, 5 CONTEMP. CRISIS 15, 22 (1981).
33
Id. at 22.
34
Id. at 20–21. See generally Tony Platt, Prospects for a Radical Criminology in the United States,
1 CRIME & SOC. JUST. 2 (1974). Platt elaborates principles of radical criminology: “Under a radical,
human rights definition, the solution to ‘crime’ lies in the revolutionary transformation of society and the
elimination of economic and political systems of exploitation.” Id. at 6.
35
Longmire, supra note 32, at 20 (quoting RICHARD QUINNEY, CLASS, STATE, AND CRIME: ON THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 162 (1977)).
36
Id. at 21.
37
For examples of scholars who linked community mediation to the possibility of collective action,
see Paul Wahrhaftig, An Overview of Community-Oriented Citizen Dispute Resolution Programs in the
United States, in 1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, supra note 7, at
75, 93–94; Richard Hofrichter, Neighborhood Justice and the Social Control Problems of American
Capitalism: A Perspective, in 1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE,
supra note 7, at 207, 243; Raymond Shonholtz, Neighborhood Justice Systems: Work, Structure, and
Guiding Principles, 5 MEDIATION Q. 3, 29 (1984); JENNIFER E. BEER, FRIENDS SUBURBAN PROJECT,
PEACEMAKING IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD: REFLECTIONS ON AN EXPERIMENT IN COMMUNITY
MEDIATION (1986).
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when people address their own conflicts in community, they can craft
outcomes that feel both more just and more reparative than what they can
receive from the state—including by deliberating about social responsibility
alongside individual responsibility for conflict, violence, and harm.38
B. Left Interpretive Questions: 1980s–1990s
In the 1980s, as experiments in community mediation unfolded on the
ground (several funded by the federal government),39 sociolegal scholars
produced a rich, interpretive literature. In this section, I briefly recount this
literature. But to be clear: my aim is not to reproduce the well-established
conclusion that many experiments failed to achieve radical ends.40 Instead, I
want to illustrate how mediation once served as a site for scholarly and political
inquiry. To that end, I briefly summarize how sociolegal scholars used the
practice of mediation to ask questions about state power and resistance.
In the 1980s, sociolegal scholars, often affiliated with the Amherst
Seminar, viewed the left turn to informal justice with both sympathetic
interest and skepticism.41 Sally Engle Merry described how mediation in
preindustrial societies maintained social orders precisely because mediators
used coercions and sanctions made possible through robust hierarchical
social relations—collective relations mostly unavailable under advanced

38
For a genealogy of the early American restorative justice movement and its roots in community
mediation, see Amy J. Cohen, Moral Restorative Justice: A Political Genealogy of Activism and
Neoliberalism in the United States, 104 MINN. L. REV. 889 (2019) [hereinafter Cohen, Moral Restorative
Justice]. See also John Braithwaite, Traditional Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, RECONCILIATION, AND
PEACEBUILDING 214, 232 (Jennifer J. Llewellyn & Daniel Philpott eds., 2014) (elaborating this argument).
39
CHRISTINE B. HARRINGTON , SHADOW JUSTICE : THE IDEOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION
OF A LTERNATIVES TO COURT 77–86 (1985); see also NAT ’ L INST . OF J UST., U.S. DEP ’T OF JUST .,
NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CENTERS FIELD TEST : FINAL EVALUATION REPORT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
(1980); A MER. BAR A SS’N, SPECIAL COMM . ON A LT. DISPUTE RESOLUTION, DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PROGRAM DIRECTORY (Larry Ray ed., 1983); DANIEL MCG ILLIS & JOAN MULLEN , NEIGHBORHOOD
JUSTICE CENTERS: AN ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL MODELS (1977); Albie M. Davis, Community
Mediation in Massachusetts: Lessons from a Decade of Development, 69 JUDICATURE 307 (1986);
Robert C. Davis, Mediation: The Brooklyn Experiment, in NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE : A SSESSMENT OF
AN EMERGING IDEA 154 (Roman Tomasic & Malcolm M. Feeley eds., 1982).
40
For some well-known and oft-cited criticisms, see generally THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR
JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY MEDIATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Sally Engle Merry & Neal
Milner eds., 1993); RICHARD HOFRICHTER, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY: THE
EXPANSION OF THE INFORMAL STATE (1987); STANLEY COHEN, AGAINST CRIMINOLOGY 217–19 (1988);
Richard L. Abel, The Contradictions of Informal Justice, in 1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, supra note 7, at 267.
41
See Susan S. Silbey, The Every Day Work of Studying the Law in Everyday Life, 15 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 1, 7 (2019) (describing the origins of the Amherst seminar: “Having originally met each
other at the Law & Society Association annual meetings in 1980 and 1981, we realized that we were all,
in one way or another, studying dispute processing—a popular subject at the time”).
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capitalism and liberalism. Hence sociolegal scholars converged on the
following question. In the United States, could community mediation
reconstruct, or would it invariably reproduce, the power of the state and
capital? Richard Abel put the query rather bluntly: do informal justice
processes “expand or reduce state control?”43
Two generative strands of scholarship followed from this question. The
first strand advanced a Foucauldian style inquiry. If informal justice expands
state power by other means, then what can analysts learn specifically,
nonreductively, about these means by studying mediation? Or, to put this
another way, in a moment when analysts were only beginning to characterize
neoliberal governance, sociolegal scholars used mediation to ask an
analytically and politically pressing question: as the state delegates and
privatizes its roles, how does it simultaneously proliferate its power?44
To engage with this question, scholars advanced a critical mode of
empirical analysis that famously refused “the pull of the policy audience.”45
For example, Christine Harrington and Sally Engle Merry studied
community mediation empirically not to measure how it achieves its stated
policy ends but rather to illuminate how its material effects are produced
through ideology.46 They differentiated among community mediation’s
dominant narratives—service delivery, personal growth, and social
transformation—and yet showed how all three narratives shared ambiguous
symbols in common, such as “community” and “consensus.”47 Reformers,
they illustrated, mobilized the meaning of community to popularize
consensual dispute resolution and yet interpreted the meaning of consent to
incorporate state mandates into mediation.48 Other scholars used mediation
to “see” the state and relations of power in interpersonal interactions and

42
See Sally Engle Merry, The Social Organization of Mediation in Nonindustrial Societies:
Implications for Informal Community Justice in America, in 2 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE:
COMPARATIVE STUDIES 17 (Richard L. Abel ed., 1982) [hereinafter Merry, Social Organization].
43
Richard L. Abel, Introduction, in 1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 7, at 1, 6.
44
See, e.g., id.; Santos, supra note 7; HARRINGTON, supra note 39; Hofrichter, supra note 37;
STANLEY COHEN, VISIONS OF SOCIAL CONTROL (1985) [hereinafter COHEN, VISIONS].
45
Austin Sarat & Susan Silbey, The Pull of the Policy Audience, 10 LAW & POL’Y 97 (1988).
46
Christine B. Harrington & Sally Engle Merry, Ideological Production: The Making of
Community Mediation, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 709, 710–11 (1988).
47
Id. at 714–17.
48
Id. at 717–23. See also COHEN, VISIONS, supra note 44, at 160. “Nobody running a community
dispute mediation centre in New York,” he argued, “actually believes that this recreates the conditions of a
Tanzanian village court any more than ‘house-parents’ in a ‘community home’ believe that they are living
in a family with their own children.” Id. But these symbols, fictions, and myths are “very much grounded in
the real world.” Id. Like Harrington and Merry, Cohen advanced an ideological mode of analysis designed
to make visible the morally ambiguous forms of power, interests, and language wielded by helping
professionals—in a moment when incarceration rates were rising, even as or perhaps because the state was
governing not only through command but also increasingly through “community.” Id. at 161–96.
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self-identities.49 Whereas reformers asked how to protect mediation’s
legitimating values, such as individual consent and self-determination, these
sociolegal scholars posed the inverse question.50 They asked how, through
mediation, a historically specific figure of a self-determining individual—a
figure on which the liberal state depends—is cultivated and created.51
A second strand of scholarship investigated mediation’s potential to build
grassroots power and change state power’s role in the process. Here, scholars
reasoned that critical interpretative studies are necessary if one also wishes to
ask about informal “counter-power” because these studies can show how
mediation is neither outside of, nor reducible to, state control and how
mediation depends upon, but does not determine, the figure of the individual.52
For example, Stuart Henry studied how housing and worker cooperatives
mediate conflicts through values associated with communalism, and he
explored how, when cooperatives engage with dominant capitalist rule
systems, “both the alternative system and the capitalist order are vulnerable to
incremental reformulations.”53 In other words, Henry invited scholars to study
not how mediation could replace existing institutions but rather how, over time
and through practice, mediation could help incrementally rearrange them.54
Maureen Cain, by contrast, urged theorists to distinguish among dispute
resolution institutions by classifying them according to the class interests
they serve.55 She described collective justice institutions where users share
a working-class identification. In these institutions, users understand
themselves as a collective subject with shared problems that could be
49
See, e.g., Silbey, Minor Disputes Processing, supra note 8, at 69–70; Susan Silbey & Austin
Sarat, Dispute Processing in Law and Legal Scholarship: From Institutional Critique to the
Reconstitution of the Juridical Subject, 66 DENV. U. L. REV. 437, 472–96 (1989).
50
See Peter Fitzpatrick, The Impossibility of Popular Justice, in THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR
JUSTICE, supra note 40, at 453, 457–58 [hereinafter Fitzpatrick, Popular Justice] (“The individual’s
voluntary participation and willingness to adapt and enter into agreements are the foundation of the whole
[alternative justice] process. . . . My analysis would reverse this mythic account. The individual is an
effect of the power exercised in processes of popular justice.”).
51
George Pavlich, The Power of Community Mediation: Government and Formation of Self-Identity,
30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 707, 728 (1996). See also Fitzpatrick, Popular Justice, supra note 50, at 457–58.
52
Peter Fitzpatrick, The Rise and Rise of Informalism, in INFORMAL JUSTICE?, supra note 7, at 178,
185 [hereinafter Fitzpatrick, Informalism]; Fitzpatrick, Popular Justice, supra note 50, at 468–72.
53
Stuart Henry, Community Justice, Capitalist Society, and Human Agency: The Dialectics of
Collective Law in the Cooperative, 19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 303, 324 (1985).
54
Id. at 324 (“[S]hort of revolution, change towards socialist legality is more likely to be fostered
by mechanisms of communal justice within institutions that do not challenge the basic premises of
capitalism than through the development of more radical conflicting institutions.”) See also Linda
Mulcahy, The Devil and the Deep Blue Sea? A Critique of the Ability of Community Mediation to
Suppress and Facilitate Participation in Civil Life, 27 J.L. & SOC’Y 133, 150 (2000) (analyzing
community mediation for “everyday resistance to state powers undertaken in small measures, and the
occasional dominance of local normative frameworks”).
55
Maureen Cain, Beyond Informal Justice, 9 CONTEMP. CRISES 335 (1985); Sally Engle Merry,
Sorting Out Popular Justice, in THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE, supra note 40, at 31, 33 n.3
(summarizing Cain’s argument).
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formulated against classed opponents, and they pursue a broad range of
strategies and processes “accountable to the collectivity (class) they work
for.”56 Cain distinguished collective justice from professionalized justice,
which depends on formal liberal legal principles and serves professional
class practices and interests. She also distinguished collective justice from
incorporated justice, where an agency of the state or of capital displaces
professionalized dispute resolution in ways that serves its own, rather than
working class, interests (Cain’s example: mediation offered by the Better
Business Bureau).57 Cain reasoned that when scholars categorize informal
justice institutions according to their class or other political interests, they
help make collective justice less vulnerable to professionalization or
incorporation—a politically useful task for the scholar because the radical
nature of collective justice institutions in capitalist societies means, she
ventured, that they will invariably lack legitimacy and resources.58
What united all of these sociolegal scholars was their effort to theorize
mediation both as part of a larger assemblage of state governance and
potentially as a disruptive practice that allows analysts to see how people
attempt to resist and change the dominant system. Capturing this double
inquiry, Boaventura de Sousa Santos predicted that, whereas state elites had
previously used formal law to disorganize classes and individuate conflicts,
“state-sponsored community organization” would replace formal law as the
preferred technique of disorganization under late capitalism.59 And yet, he
continued, “[i]t would be a gross mistake” to think of informal justice “as
sheer manipulation and state conspiracy.”60 Because mediation depends on
symbols such as “participation, self-government, and real community,” it is
vulnerable to “an autonomous political movement of the dominated classes”
who wish to unleash the liberatory potential of these symbols.61
As the next section describes, by the early 1990s, sociolegal scholars’
political and analytical questions—as they pursued them through the study of
mediation—faded just as ADR was consolidating as a field in legal education.
C. The Rise of ADR as a Field in Legal Education: 1980s–2000s
As left sociolegal scholars debated the possibilities of informal justice to
advance progressive social change, the legal reformers who are today
remembered as founding the modern field of ADR in law schools—think
Chief Justice Warren Burger and Harvard law professor Frank Sander—were
56

Cain, supra note 55, at 346. For example, Cain described early twentieth century American labor
courts. Id.
57
Id. at 353. She also distinguished collective justice from populist justice. Id. at 360–64.
58
Id. at 365.
59
Santos, supra note 7, at 261.
60
Id. at 264.
61
Id.
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engaged in a parallel but different conversation.62 These reformers proffered
criticisms of state adjudication but not criticisms of state power. In 1976, as
the over-use of courts became understood by some as a national problem,
Sander posed some general and, as it turned out, extremely generative
questions about institutional competence. He criticized lawyers and law
teachers for assuming that “courts are the natural and obvious dispute
resolvers,” and he asked if it was possible “to develop some rational criteria
for allocating various types of disputes to different dispute resolution
processes.”63 For example, Sander ventured that people experiencing
low-level civil and family cases may experience more creative, efficient,
pro-social resolutions if their cases are channeled into mediation rather than
court adjudication.64
From this reformist perspective, asking, “how does the state extend its
reach as it delegates its functions?” was just not a compelling research
question. To the contrary, Sander found it simply “interesting to note that . . .
most of the experiments to date [with community moots] have involved
alternatives to the criminal courts.”65 “Is this the result of some conceptual
notion,” he pondered, “or, as I suspect, because, like the reputed response of
Willie Sutton, the famed bank robber when asked why he robbed banks,
‘that’s where the money is’?”66 Sander implied the answer was the latter,
obscuring from view how earlier efforts to envisage community mediation
were motivated and justified by a normative critique of state power. And,
because he pioneered a version of ADR that was not only informal, but also
pro-state, Sander along with his collaborators could establish it as a field in
legal education.
In this section, my argument is as follows: in the mid-1980s, sociolegal
scholars engaged Sander’s institutional reform project, but their criticisms
were largely unavailing. As ADR coalesced as a legal field, its practices and
questions narrowed. ADR proponents, working in the tradition inspired by
Sander, aimed to provide a flexible menu of process options but without
reproducing more income, racial, or gendered inequalities than disputants
would otherwise encounter in state adjudication. As they confronted legal
feminists and critical race scholars who argued that mediation harms women
and minorities, these ADR proponents ceded to state adjudication conflicts
62

Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.— Need for Systematic Anticipation, 15 JUDGES’ J. 27,
32 (1976); Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, Address Delivered at the National
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (Apr. 7–9, 1976),
in 70 F.R.D. 79, 111 (1976) [hereinafter Sander, Address].
63
Sander, Address, supra note 62, at 112–13.
64
Id. at 118–20; see also Frank E. A. Sander, Family Mediation: Problems and Prospects,
MEDIATION Q., Dec. 1983, at 3, 5–6.
65
Sander, Address, supra note 62, 128 n.45
66
Id. (emphasis added).
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that they deemed to involve public political interests. For the private
conflicts they retained, they proposed to import formal legality to address
inequalities. And the more ADR proponents turned to legal formalism—a
tool used to regulate more than upend an existing social order—the more
they turned away from asking about the role of informal dispute resolution
in advancing broad-scale social transformations.
In 1985, Sander along with Stephen Goldberg and Eric Green published the
first ADR casebook Dispute Resolution,67 a sign, Carrie Menkel-Meadow
observed, that the “periphery” was becoming the “core.”68 The casebook
prompted two critical reviews by sociolegal scholars—Austin Sarat in the Law
& Society Review69 and Sally Engle Merry in the Harvard Law Review.70 Both
agreed the casebook marked an important shift: the legal academy was
finally taking the study of nonjudicial dispute processing seriously. But the
casebook did so in ways that revealed a chasm between sociolegal scholars
and law professors.71
Sarat submitted that the book’s “neglect [of] some of the most
important . . . insights of the sociological study of disputing” was baked into
its structure—it presents dispute processes as sets of abstract, essential
attributes à la Lon Fuller.72 For example, law students learn that “the mediator,
in contrast with the arbitrator, has no power to impose an outcome on
disputing parties.”73 What students do not learn, however, is that mediators
exercise power and coercion in diverse ways in different contexts.74 The
student also learns that mediation is future-oriented, relational, flexible, and
participatory. “In this description,” Sarat quipped, “the advertised advantages
of mediation are taken as its essential attributes. Failure to display these
attributes means that a disputing process cannot claim to be mediation; it must
be something else.”75 Lest readers suspect that Sarat was exaggerating, recall
67

STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, ERIC D. GREEN & FRANK E. A. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1985).
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Dispute Resolution: The Periphery Becomes the Core, 69 JUDICATURE
300, 300 (1986) [hereinafter Menkel-Meadow, Periphery].
69
Austin Sarat, The “New Formalism” in Disputing and Dispute Processing, 21 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 695 (1988).
70
Sally Engle Merry, Disputing Without Culture, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2057 (1987) [hereinafter
Merry, Culture].
71
Sarat, supra note 69, at 696.
72
Id. at 696–97. Fuller famously proposed to define the key attributes of different dispute processes.
See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, Mediation—Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 312 (1971); Lon
L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 354 (1978).
73
Sarat, supra note 69, at 697.
74
Id. For examples, see generally Merry, Social Organization, supra note 42; Susan S. Silbey &
Sally E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAW & POL’Y 7 (1986).
75
Sarat, supra note 68, at 698. He elaborated further:
68

[T]he contexts and practices of mediation are given less attention than is the effort to
achieve a kind of definitional purity. . . . For contemporary formalists the mediator
who exercises power or advances a zero-sum solution is not doing mediation.
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my introductory observation that ADR audiences doubted that CVICT dispute
processing could properly be characterized as mediation. The casebook also
presented disputes as sufficiently stable so they could be matched to
appropriate processes. But sociolegal scholarship, Merry objected, has already
shown how disputes are cultural events that emerge and are used in social
relationships in open-ended ways.76 Disputes may shift and transform with a
“chameleonlike quality” depending on participants and audiences—and
frequently without any sort of final resolution.77
To be sure, these sociological insights do not prevent ADR practitioners
from deciding to characterize a dispute to “fit[] the forum to the fuss”78
potentially to the benefit of some people in conflict.79 But sociolegal scholars
suspected the casebook’s apolitical framing: Who would fit what fusses to
what forums and with what justificatory basis? The fitter would need a
theory about “how to define the problems, what kinds of coercive force to
impose on parties, and what value society should place on problems of each
type,” Merry argued.80 Maureen Cain and Kalman Kulcsar had likewise
previously submitted that “the question ‘how can we help people/society
eliminate disputes?’” is atheoretical81—that is, it lacks systematic reflection
on its motivating assumptions and hence can unfold without making explicit
its biases and political functions.
Finally, both Merry and Sarat rejected Dispute Resolution’s call for
empirical research. The casebook concludes, Merry bristled, with a plea for
research to narrow the gap between design and implementation, “suggesting
that the problem is one of expertise, not politics.”82 Sarat likewise argued that
the book’s empirical questions assign the social scientist the labor of
correcting mistakes, educating and influencing policymakers, and facilitating

Formalism thus presents a nonfalsifiable portrait of dispute processing techniques in
which all that sociologists can do is to evaluate practices in light of ideal types.
Id. at 698, 710.
76
Merry, Culture, supra note 70, at 2065.
77
Id. For examples, see Sally Engle Merry, Going to Court: Strategies of Dispute Management in
an American Urban Neighborhood, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 891 (1979); Lynn Mather & Barbara
Yngvesson, Language, Audience, and the Transformation of Disputes, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 775
(1981); Sally Engle Merry & Susan Silbey, What Do Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept of
Dispute, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 151 (1984); Marilyn Strathern, Discovering ‘Social Control’, 12 J.L. & SOC’Y
111 (1985).
78
Frank E.A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide
to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49, 66 (1994).
79
See Marshall, supra note 19, at 39.
80
Merry, Culture, supra note 70, at 2067. She concluded that “[t]he book ignores the social,
cultural, and political dimensions of ADR, but this neglect accurately represents the unreflective nature
of the ADR movement as a whole.” Id. at 2060.
81
Cain & Kulcsar, supra note 6, at 388.
82
Merry, Culture, supra note 70, at 2067.
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best practices by evaluating institutions against ideal types. Hence, even if
ADR could facilitate a dialogue “between the sociology of law and the legal
academy,” Sarat warned that sociolegal scholars would pay a high price to
enter the conversation.84
ADR proponents and sociolegal scholars never came to speak the other’s
language.85 For their part, sociolegal scholars soon turned to the study of
other kinds of informalisms—for example, the vernacularization of human
rights; the rise of extralegal governance technologies such as standards,
indicators, risk assessments; and the growth of collaborative managerial
practices in state and private institutions.86 Some pursued the study of social
ordering in “nondispute situations,” contributing to work that Merry called
new legal pluralism because it examines how multiple legal systems coexist
in nearly all societies.87 ADR proponents meanwhile consolidated their own
field, proliferating classes and casebooks.
In 1993, William Twining took stock of what was then a burgeoning
American ADR literature. He simplified it thus: there is literature on
institutional design that asks about “the appropriateness of different methods
of dispute resolution to various types of ‘dispute.’”88 There is literature that
offers “essentially political debates about the desirability and necessity of
encouraging and developing ADR on a large scale.”89 And there is literature
devoted to teaching ADR practice skills to law students and lawyers. “The
vast bulk of these three bodies of literature,” he concluded, “is atheoretical.”90
Early sociolegal scholars had used theory as a tool to grapple with a
contradiction. They criticized formal law and they also criticized the turn to
informal justice, which they interpreted as, among other things, elite backlash
to the rights revolution. Yet they hardly depicted formal legality as a tool of

83

Sarat, supra note 69, at 706–07.
Id. at 712.
85
For a significant exception, see Menkel-Meadow, Periphery, supra note 68, at 302–03 (“My concern
here is that [Goldberg, Green, and Sander’s] book has something of an advocate’s tone . . . . Where, one
might ask, are excerpts of such trenchant criticisms of informal justice as [those written by sociolegal
scholars]?”). For an early interdisciplinary reader on mediation, see CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW,
MEDIATION: THEORY, POLICY AND PRACTICE xiii (2001).
86
See, e.g., SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING
INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE (2006); THE QUIET POWER OF INDICATORS: MEASURING
GOVERNANCE, CORRUPTION, AND RULE OF LAW (Sally Engle Merry, Kenneth Davis, and Benedict
Kingsbury eds., 2015); Susan Silbey, Ruthanne Huising & Salo Vinocur Coslovsky, The “Sociological
Citizen” Relational Interdependence in Law and Organizations, 59 L’ANNÉE SOCIOLOGIQUE 201 (2009).
87
Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 873, 890 (1988).
88
William Twining, Alternative to What? Theories of Litigation, Procedure and Dispute Settlement
in Anglo-American Jurisprudence: Some Neglected Classics, 56 MOD. L. REV. 380, 380 (1993).
89
Id.
90
Id. at 381.
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genuine social and economic emancipation.91 Hence even as they criticized
informalism, some early sociolegal scholars continued to analyze its potential
to produce a “‘genuinely’ human and popular form of justice.”92 In other
words, these scholars used theory as Ethan Miller defines it: as a “tool for
challenging fixed modes of thought, opening up new possibilities, and
enabling transformative action in the world.”93 Many ADR proponents simply
had a different normative and practical orientation: they wanted to work with
the world as it is—not to unravel and reimagine its basic organizing categories
but rather incrementally to improve existing institutions.94
For example, and as Twining observed, ADR scholars produced a
literature engaged in political debates about the benefits and dangers of
entrenching ADR at a national scale. But this literature had a specific target.
In the 1980s, law professors, such as Owen Fiss and Richard Delgado,
published important articles that censured ADR and defended formal legality
(largely without also criticizing it) as a shield against inequality.95 ADR
proponents mostly entered this second conversation. In response to arguments
that mediation favors the strong over the weak, they asked the following kinds
of policy-oriented questions: How should they limit their field of cases? How
91
For a review of these arguments, see, for example, David M. Trubek, Turning Away from Law?,
82 MICH. L. REV. 824 (1984). Trubek concludes: “The high priests celebrate an informalism they don't
believe in, while the critics reluctantly champion a formalism they distrust.” Id. at 835.
92
Cain, supra note 55, at 335 (“Academic criticism and negative evaluation have created . . . a
feeling that the devil of formal justice whom we know may, after all, be better than hisdangerously
unfamiliar informal brother. This chorus is occasionally punctuated by an attenuated left wing squeak of
hope that by some dialectical feat a ‘genuinely’ human and popular form of justice may emerge in spite
of all from this newly identified diabolical situation . . . . This article is an attempt to make that squeak a
little stronger.”) See also Abel, supra note 43, at 12 (“[T]he moral ambiguity of informalism must mean
that it can liberate as well as oppress”); Santos, supra note 7, at 265 (“Community justice cannot be
ideological without at some time being implicitly utopian. It cannot manipulate unless it offers some
‘genuine shred of content as a fantasy bribe to the community members about to be manipulated’ . . . .
Resistance against manipulation must start from that genuine shred of content.”) (citation omitted);
Fitzpatrick, Informalism, supra note 52, at 195 (theorizing how understanding informalism “as an effect
of relations of power” could “lead to the identification of counter-powers otherwise denied or obscured
in the domain of the informal” and made visible in alterative, non-state legal systems); Steven Spitzer,
The Dialectics of Formal and Informal Control, 1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE, supra note 7, at 167, 169 (“[E]ven if ‘the politics of informal justice’ is no more than an
ideological arena in which larger social struggles are being fought, the very visibility and ubiquity of
these politics make them an important subject for investigation.”).
93
ETHAN MILLER, REIMAGINING LIVELIHOODS: LIFE BEYOND ECONOMY, SOCIETY, AND
ENVIRONMENT xvii (2019).
94
Robert Mnookin aptly summarizes this orientation: “Proponents of ADR regularly argue that
arbitration and mediation—the two primary ADR processes—reduce the transaction cost of resolution
and otherwise lead to better outcomes. In assessing the benefits and costs of these procedures it is, of
course, necessary to ask: Compared to what?” Robert Mnookin, Alternative Dispute Resolution (Harv.
L. Sch., John M. Olin Ctr. for L., Econ. & Bus. Discussion Paper Series No. 232, 1998).
95
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Richard Delgado, Chris Dunn,
Pamela Brown, Helena Lee & David Hubbert, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice
in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359 (1985).
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should they marshal what kinds of empirical evidence? How should they
design specific kinds of legal regulations and procedural safeguards?96
The feminist legal movement hastened ADR proponents’ mobilization of
formal legality. In the 1970s, as Danzig was calling for community intervenors
to replace the police, other reformers were arguing to informalize the police
by teaching them mediation.97 Feminists successfully organized against
informal police interventions in cases of domestic violence.98 But, having won
the battle for mandatory arrests, they confronted judges, prosecutors, and court
administrators diverting arrested men into mediation.99
Community mediators defended their decision to mediate cases of
domestic violence—at least for a while. In 1978, Anna Laszlo and
then-Assistant District Attorney Thomas McKean described their
community mediation center’s work before Congress: “[W]e saw everything
from threats to assault with a dangerous weapon to attempted homicide.”100
For such cases, they used community mediators, without lawyers present,
on the assumption that they would “get closer to the problems involved and
would also get the community involved in the whole problem of wife
beating.”101 In 1982, mediators Linda Singer and Charles Bethel likewise
explained their judgement that mediating some domestic violence cases
could produce safety, separation, and behavioral change via contract.102
They described mediation as voluntary only insofar as individuals make
choices within a context of “coercive external pressures.”103 Offenders face
criminal charges and victims face their own constraints: they “may be
uninterested in prosecution not only out of fear, but also out of love, or
economic concerns, or consideration for children.”104 And they reasoned that
the coercions produced through mediation could better serve the interests of

96

See, e.g., GOLDBERG, GREEN & SANDER, supra note 67. For a review of some of these arguments,
see generally Amy J. Cohen, Revisiting Against Settlement: Some Reflections on Dispute Resolution and
Public Values, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1143 (2009).
97
See, e.g., U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB: BATTERED WOMEN AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 18–19 (1982) (describing police training techniques that “call for the
responding officer to calm the dispute, listen carefully to both parties without showing favoritism or
fixing blame, and to suggest ways to resolve the problem without involvement of the criminal justice
system” and arguing that these practices of mediation are misapplied to domestic violence cases).
98
See, e.g., Laurie Woods, Mediation: A Backlash to Women’s Progress on Family Law Issues, 19
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 431, 432 (1985).
99
Id. at 432–33.
100
Anna T. Laszlo, Court Diversion: An Alternative to Spousal Abuse Cases, Presentation at a
Consultation Sponsored by the United States Commission on Civil Rights, in BATTERED WOMEN: ISSUES
OF PUBLIC POLICY 65 (Jan. 30–31, 1978).
101
Id. at 87–88 (comment by Thomas McKean during discussion).
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Charles A. Bethel & Linda R. Singer, Mediation: A New Remedy for Cases of Domestic
Violence, 7 VT. L. REV. 15, 21–25 (1982).
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Id. at 19.
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Id. at 30.
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some victims than the coercions of the formal penal system.105 In 1984,
Dianna Stallone described centers where mediators added a political
justification to this practice: namely, “keep[ing] men of color out of the
criminal system.”106 “Protecting the interests of men of color is a somewhat
unknown although expressed function of mediation,” she conceded (she,
however, was not persuaded).107
By the mid-1980s, feminist domestic violence advocates had effectively
won this fight. They described mediation as a “voluntary, noncoercive
process” when what was needed were rules that emanate from the state
applied consistently by decisionmakers.108 There was only a defense of state
power in this anti-violence, anti-mediation writing. For their part, ADR
proponents conceded the feminist’s rule of law hierarchy. Most agreed that
cases involving any sort of (non-trivial) crime, let alone domestic violence,
should not be mediated.109 For the conflicts that ADR proponents retained
for mediation, such as divorce and child custody, they proposed formal
legality to manage private inequalities. For example, Craig McEwen, Nancy
Rogers, and Richard Maiman described an unfortunate perception that “one
must choose between a ‘lawyered’ process ending in the courtroom, and an
informal, problem-solving process.”110 They wanted the state to mandate
divorcing spouses into mediation. But they also wanted “attorneys [to]
participate regularly and vigorously.”111 Their research suggested that
lawyer participation in mediated processes could protect women’s interests.
By 1995—the time McEwen, Rogers, and Maiman wrote their widely
cited article “Bring in the Lawyers”—American ADR retained few traces of
the anti-legalist, anti-capitalist radicalism that once inspired left interest in
informal justice.112 ADR proponents began to discuss appropriate rather than
105
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Dianna R. Stallone, Decriminalization of Violence in the Home: Mediation in Wife Battering
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alternative dispute resolution and some argued that ADR could advance rule
of law values—an argument roughly analogous to the idea that a
well-functioning legal system needs a mix of clear rules and equitable
standards.113 Carrie Menkel-Meadow encouraged scholars to think less
about formalism versus informalism than about how to evaluate hybrid
institutions in a dispute resolution landscape increasingly characterized by
process pluralism.114 To be sure, the field developed its own criticisms. ADR
proponents, prominently Jean Sternlight, traced how mandatory arbitration
(and the legal architecture supporting it) served corporate more than
consumer interests.115 Other ADR scholars argued to preserve liberal values
such as individual consent, party self-determination, and procedural justice
in court-annexed mediation.116
D. Crisis in the Center
ADR scholars have not given up on theory and politics. But all too often
the contemporary field does not engage in world-making questions about the
kinds of people and social orders they hoped that ADR techniques and
values would nurture and advance.117 To recall Twining’s 1993 trilogy: we
continue to have institutional design literature indebted to legal process
theory but now this literature often includes efforts to address larger social
conflicts beyond the multidoor courthouse.118 We also continue to have
rigidities of law and formal legal institutions has now developed a law of its own.” Id. at 1. She continued:
“[A] critical challenge to the status quo has been blunted, indeed co-opted, by the very forces I had hoped
would be changed by some ADR forms and practices.” Id. at 3.
113
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AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT THE CROSSROADS 419, 428 (Felix Steffek, Hannes Unberath, Hazel Genn,
Reinhard Greger & Carrie Menkel-Meadow eds., 2013).
115
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argument implicitly expresses a critical legal sensibility because it describes how an extrajudicial process
(arbitration) works together with judicial and statutory authority against the interests of weaker parties.
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Kupfer Schneider & Sarah Rudolph Cole eds., 2021).
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political debates in which ADR scholars mobilize the benefits of formal
legality to speak fairness to power119 and mobilize empirical evidence for
policy-oriented aims, such as to improve the quality of an ADR process.120
And, as Twining observed, we have literature grounded in skills training.121
Briefly described, this third strand of writing teaches people how to
negotiate across a range of economic, social, and political relations. It
translates basic neoclassical economic concepts into popular principles so
that people can practice Pareto optimality and transaction cost minimization
in their workplaces and families.122 Some scholars have also infused these
practices with relational feminist sensibilities123 and psychological writing
on self-reflexivity and interpersonal connection.124 But, read as a whole, this
relational literature developed apart from any broader structural vision that
would place political or ethical limits on how these skills could travel
without friction. As ADR created its own market for professional expertise
and industry best practices, scholars established consultancy firms and
businesses, some remaining within (but with many prominent writers opting
out of) full-time law teaching. And they translated knowledge about
interpersonal practice into something that could be sold and bought across
any kind of public, family, workplace, market, or corporate context.125
Questions for the Future of the Dispute Resolution Field, in THEORIES OF CHANGE, supra note 9, at 82,
82; see also Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Beyond Settlement: Reconceptualizing ADR as “Conflict
Process Strategy”, 35 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 705, 735 (2020) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Conflict
Process Strategy].
119
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Commodification has taken a significant toll on the field. For example,
in a recent volume that asked contributors to limn a vision for the future,
John Lande lamented that “[t]he dispute resolution field in American legal
education is facing a slow-moving demographic disaster,” describing how
law schools now view ADR as “‘merely practice courses’” and hence are
replacing retiring tenured faculty with adjuncts.126 Or as Douglass Yarn
recently reported: “My dean polled deans on the AALS dean listserv about
whether ADR (just as an example of a people skills delivery mechanism)
attracts students. . . . [S]he got a resounding ‘no’ . . . . This partially informed
her decision to spend resources elsewhere.”127
Several contributors to this volume therefore argued that ADR must stand
apart from industry best practices. “Would we remain excited about the field,”
Lela Love asked, if we taught the model of commercial mediation actually
practiced (in which mediators often help parties evaluate the legal merits of a
case so they can reach a cost-effective settlement)?128 Or Nancy Welsh: could
mediation serve as “midwife[e]” to “more humanistic successor processes and
practices,” such as the ethical practices advanced by collaborative law (an
anti-adversarial approach to lawyering in divorce negotiations)?129 Or
Eisenberg: being a “how-focused field . . . . is not sufficient” (by which she
means a field focused on apolitical skills training).130 Or as Lande summarized
the prevailing sentiment: “most of us are deeply concerned about promoting
substantive justice in human interactions, not only procedural justice or
efficiency,” and “many of us want to help promote just outcomes in individual
cases and in dealing with major social problems.”131
There is urgency, even a sense of alienation, in this summary. For
decades, progressive ADR scholars have witnessed the growth of consumer
and workplace arbitration and efficiency-oriented court annexed mediation,
never having wanted the field to become so tethered to privatization through
the market and freedom-of-contract ideology. ADR scholars, in other words,
are today struggling to reclaim the field as a site for meaning-making as well
as a set of tools that professionals have on offer (many of which have been
put to political and economic ends that they themselves did not desire).
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But with what theories of the individual, community, and the state—and
with what theories of property, democracy, and violence—could the field
organize a humanistic project? With what analytical and methodological
commitments could it organize a research program devoted to substantive
justice? In 1982, Cain and Kulcsar criticized dispute theorists for failing to
construct a theory of the social order that dispute resolution practices are
meant to function within. That is, they criticized dispute theorists for asking
“the reformist question of ‘how can order be created’” rather than the
sociological question of “how is order possible.”132 One consequence, Cain
and Kulcsar argued, of this reformist orientation is that dispute theorists may
become vulnerable to the view “that moments of disorder must be stopped,”
without articulating a political account of why this should be so, available
for scholarly criticism and debate.133 A second consequence of this reformist
orientation, I would add, is that it may constrain ADR proponents from
seeing that what might look like disorder—or at least what might look like
divisive and confrontational politics—may have embedded within it
extensive attention to how to build and proliferate skills in mediation.
Allow me to explain. As I pivot to the second Part of this Article,
consider recent comments by Heidi Burgess and Guy Burgess,
scholar-practitioners devoted to handling intractable conflict. They explain
why they believe “[d]efund the police” is a regrettable slogan: it attacks the
police and “does not at all acknowledge the role that citizens themselves
play in making communities unsafe.”134 A conflict intervenor would do well,
Burgess and Burgess suggest, to propose “a more constructive choice of
words to encourage people to think about conflict in more constructive
ways.”135 And yet, in suggesting common frames to translate confrontational
politics into productive and proleptic action, Burgess and Burgess
misdescribe reality on the ground. Movement organizers seeking to defund
the police think endlessly about how citizens make communities unsafe and
also potentially safe. That is why they are intensely interested in mediation.
But their version of community mediation diverges sharply from how most
legal scholars understand contemporary ADR.
As the following Part describes, transformative justice (TJ) is a
contemporary effort to take back control over conflict, including harm,
132
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violence, and abuse—that aims neither to reinforce existing inequalities nor
to give away power to an external decisionmaker. To advance this ever
elusive ambition, TJ grounds itself broadly in the following commitments:
it seeks transformations of self-understandings, interpersonal relations, and
political and economic systems simultaneously; it resists professionalization
(i.e., in TJ processes, facilitators are already people in relation); it resists
commodification (i.e., facilitation is not a service offered for hire); it does
not seek to constrain harmers who refuse to participate, even as facilitators
aim to create conditions that will motivate harmers to see participation as in
their interest; it invites communities, identified through explicit
conversations, to influence processes; and it is ambivalent about whether or
how these processes should scale.
In the following Part II.A, I simply elaborate TJ on its own terms, using
writings and presentations prepared by TJ practitioners because I wish to offer
readers a textured sense of its processes and commitments—even as I should
stress that TJ is an emergent, grassroots practice intended to accommodate
diversity and experimentation. In Part II.B, I suggest that TJ is a contemporary
version of the kinds of practices that once inspired critical sociolegal inquiry
in mediation. I ask readers to think of TJ as a kind of mediation, and, in so
doing, I suggest that the contemporary field need not be thought of as a
politics-free, neutral collection of techniques for resolving interpersonal or
commercial disputes. The fact that movements for penal abolition are turning
to ADR-like tools and practices suggests that ADR could be thought of as a
field with an important set of critical, albeit also irresolvable, questions linked
to macro political, economic, and social change.
II. THE RISE OF TRANSFORMATIVE JUSTICE
A. To Build an Alternative World, You Begin by Learning How to Apologize
In 2002, I was studying community mediation in Nepal in a moment
when the country was in political crisis. That year, first the Prime Minister
and then the King dissolved democratically elected government bodies as
Maoist insurgents waged an armed rebellion against the reigning
constitutional monarchy.136 A mediator began his village training “by
lighting three candles: the first dedicated to the ‘martyrs of democracy,’ the
second to ‘fighters for human rights,’ and the third to ‘victims of [police]
torture.’”137 He continued his lament: “When will this end? We don’t know.
Even the government does not obey the Constitution. We must protect the
human rights guaranteed in our Constitution, especially women’s rights. We
136
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must not suppress women’s rights in the mediation process. This is what this
training is for.”138 With this frame, villagers were taught to embrace political
commitments—e.g., to gender and caste equality—to address conflict and
harm without state assistance and according to higher-order cosmopolitan
values that meant caring for disputants with the least access to formal or
informal power.
Here is how a transformative justice training139 began in 2020—now the
political crisis is that of the United States: “I want to reground . . . always in
our commitment to liberation for Black lives, liberation for trans and queer
lives, and liberation from cages and policing, liberation for all . . . .”140 The
trainer paused solemnly: “I would like to also take a moment to honor the
memory of Breonna Taylor, Nina Pop, Tony McDade, Ahmaud Arbery,
George Floyd, Cornelius Fredericks, and the countless lives that we’ve lost
to the agents of white supremacy and anti-Blackness.”141 This, then, is a
basic distinction: like my trainings in far-eastern Nepal, and unlike nearly
all forms of contemporary ADR, this webinar linked informal justice to
political liberation.
This is liberation not from a repressive monarchy but rather from the
American prison industrial complex (PIC). That is, from surveillance,
policing, and imprisonment and from all the ways in which these practices
reflect and reproduce white supremacy, racial capitalism, and gendered
violence. Mariame Kaba makes this point foundational and plain. “You
cannot understand transformative justice if you don’t understand PIC
abolition,” she explains.142 “Everybody who believes in transformative
justice . . . has to believe in PIC abolition.”143
This was not always so explicitly the case. In North America in the
1990s, Ruth Morris first popularized the term transformative justice. Morris,
herself a prison abolitionist, was then attempting to consolidate a political
criticism of restorative justice.144 Restorative justice is a mediative process
where offenders and victims (potentially alongside their families and
138
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communities) deliberate about how to remedy instances of harm and
violence.145 Morris reasoned that restorative justice is incommensurably
better than retribution administered by the state. But she also argued that
restorative justice all too often omits “the social causes of all events” and
fails to confront “distributive injustice.”146 Many restorativists agreed. In
1990, for example, Howard Zehr clarified that “restorative justice must often
be transformative justice. To make things right, it may be necessary not
merely to return to situations and people to their original condition, but to
go beyond.”147
Transformative justice thus once signaled a general commitment among
restorative justice scholars to theorizing interpersonal restoration and social
transformation in one breath. Today, anti-violence PIC-abolitionist feminists
continue to articulate this commitment and to draw on restorative principles and
practices.148 But they also build on practices that originated not with restorative
justice scholars as much as “from BIPOC communities, from sex workers, from
trans people, or people who were street-based”—people who could not access
state law enforcement to respond to harm.149 And they have identified a range
of strategies to prevent, interrupt, and transform harm, including through
facilitating processes. What are often called community accountability
processes typically involve small groups, including people present to support
harmers and survivors, that are organized around concrete goals. Facilitators
convene deliberative interventions that work towards ways that people who
cause harm, for example, can meet the concrete needs that survivors articulate,
including for recognition that a harm took place.150 All of these strategies are
understood as part of achieving transformative justice defined as part of mass
grassroots political organizing to abolish the penal and capitalist state.
Rearticulated as a social movement praxis, TJ cultivates a focus on life in
its entirety, and especially on one’s intimate relationships. Indeed, at the same
145
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time as ADR proponents and other reformers were certifying gendered
violence as suitable only for the state,151 early TJ organizers were forging their
practice by doing just the opposite. “We’ve so long understood in our bones,”
recalls Mimi Kim, “that there was something wrong with relying on the police
state to protect us from gender-based violence.”152 The basic idea is that the
state—through law enforcement, social services, and contracting these
functions through the market—has failed to institutionalize the relationships
necessary to advance accountability, healing, and safety. To the contrary,
organizers argue, the state reproduces the kind of coercive power and control
that defines sexual violence and, all too often, it reproduces sexual violence in
policing, prison, wars, the military, and at borders.153
To respond to harm outside of state systems, relationship building is the
bedrock principle: “we have to actually transform our relationships to each
other enough so that we can see that we can keep each other safe,” Kaba
inspires.154 Relationship building is also therefore understood as a shield
against state power: without it, Mia Mingus elaborates, “our movements . . .
[are] more vulnerable to the state . . . to come in and divide and conquer us,
to separate us, to exploit us.”155 Or as adrienne maree brown puts it: “our
movements are in danger because we don’t know how to handle conflict or
how to move towards accountability in satisfying and collective ways.”156
TJ thus enacts a sharp distinction between state and popular power and,
in so doing, cultivates an ethics of conflict intervention that diverges sharply
from professional models common today in modern Euro-American states.
In TJ, there is no service for a professional to provide—either through a
labor-market or through philanthropic volunteerism. TJ facilitators convene
processes only within their own communities. “We are not talking about
being missionaries and going into somebody else’s community . . . . we are
talking about people who already have relationship with each other,” Mingus
explains.157 Likewise Kaba makes clear: “I never seek out any processes.
151
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Ever.” She facilitates only when she is already “in community with people
who aren’t going to avail themselves of the systems that currently exist for
multiple reasons.”159
By insisting on already existing relationships as a precondition for
facilitation, TJ organizers also aim to decommodify the skills and labor of
conflict intervention. TJ practitioners do not facilitate for hire, even as they
do think about how to make their work and livelihoods sustainable (for
example, several trainings I attended charged a small fee). Facilitation,
however, is presented as political work and, perhaps more precisely, part of
a social commons. Hence, Kaba: “It’s work that belongs to everyone,”160 or
Hassan: “There is no such thing as an expert” in TJ, just people with more
or less practice.161 The work is solidaristic and sacrificial. As Ejeris Dixon
recalls: “There was a five-year point in my life where my cell phone number
was also a hotline . . . . And I did it gladly and I’m happy I did, but it’s a
particular way to organize, [and] it’s also a really challenging way to live.”162
It is through such gifts of time, patience, and emotional labor—indeed, it is
through what Roberto Unger calls love defined as a “gift of self”163—that
facilitators express the movement’s dual commitment: on the one hand, to
the reality that oppression shapes harmful acts, and, on the other hand, to the
belief that harmers can take responsibility and choose to do otherwise. As
Kim reflects, recognizing “root causes” means convening a process where
“we have time for [the person who causes harm] to get to” the truth of what
happened (which in practice may mean several months to a few years).164
Given the time and labor-intensive nature of a TJ intervention, it follows
that the mass proliferation of relational skills and capacities is crucial to the
movement. “We have to do work to say: How are we going to build the kinds
of skillsets and capacities within our intimate networks so that we can
respond well when somebody comes forward about violence or harm or
abuse that they’ve experienced?” Mingus teaches.165 Because “we can talk
about mass incarceration forever; we can talk about colonization . . . racism
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NYC, FACEBOOK, at 41:00 (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.facebook.com/watch/live/?v=3632305546689
60&ref=watch_permalink (webinar facilitated by North Star Fund) (comment by Dixon).
163
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL
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and white supremacy [and] . . . patriarchy . . . [but] when actual violence
happens a lot of us don’t know what the hell to do.”166
From this perspective, the challenge is not simply that people don’t
know how to respond to violence or mediate conflict. The challenge is that
structures of domination are constantly experienced and performed through
self and social interactions. “White supremacy, ableism, classism,
homophobia, trans phobia exist everywhere, even in radical spaces,” Kaba
reminds listeners in collaborative trainings.167 Capitalism, for example,
means that we have all internalized competition and fear rather than mutual
aid and interdependence. Criminalization and punishment mean we all have
“cops in our heads and hearts.”168 Indeed, it means that “most of us are in an
abusive relationship with ourselves . . . let alone other people.”169
The basic insight here is anarchist: that there is a mutually constitutive
relationship between political organization and self-transformation. The state,
as Gustav Landauer taught, “is not something that can be destroyed by a
revolution, but is a condition, a certain relationship between human beings, a
mode of human behavior; we destroy it by contracting other relationships, by
behaving differently.”170 Hence, relationship building is prefigurative—or
perhaps more accurately, it is a way of insisting that transformative justice
already exists. One recognizes in the relationships they already have the kinds
of reciprocal, solidaristic, nonstatist networks they wish to create at a larger
scale. And, in so doing, one aims to build mass grassroots political power.
In trainings, facilitators may therefore suggest that people don’t rush to
grapple with the hardest cases—should one have a TJ process with a killer
cop or a “Voldemort batterer”?171 Instead, people are encouraged to think
about the everyday conflicts and low-level harms in the relationships they
already have and wish to continue. One learns, for example, to become clear
about one’s moral values and hence to recognize when they have
transgressed them. One also learns that self-accountability—restoring a right
166

Id. at 39:39.
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PEOPLE, http://fmfp.org/community-of-care-statement (last visited Oct. 25, 2021).
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Brooks, Kim & Mingus, supra note 155, at 49:45 (comment by Mingus).
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relationship with one’s own values—is necessary to nurture accountability
in relationships with others.
And perhaps most significantly, one learns to think about accountability
as a set of micro-skills that one can constantly practice in everyday
relationships. For example, I took a three-hour packed-to-capacity training
led by abolitionist educator Mia Mingus on how to give a genuine
apology.172 We practiced self-reflection and interpersonal understanding as
preconditions for behavior change and making reparations, and we were
encouraged to grow these skills by applying them to small conflicts.173 And
one learns that all of this is sacred work: it is the process of becoming
someone who can participate in breaking generational cycles of violence and
therefore someone who can participate in their own liberation: “Even if your
apology is about something small, understand that it is connected to a
broader collective cultural shift we are trying to create.”174
To be sure—and precisely because self-transformation is understood as
necessary to achieve broader social and cultural shifts—TJ practitioners must
negotiate tensions between their commitments to supporting voluntary,
autonomous action and their commitments to creating solidaristic social
relations. As I mentioned above, early facilitators evolved their practice from
grassroots responses to help survivors of gendered violence and trauma. In
that spirit, many design survivor-oriented processes that aim to cultivate
choice, agency, and self-determination with and for survivors because these
are precisely the experiences of the self that trauma denies. At the same time,
facilitators will not use processes to advance punishment understood as the
intentional infliction of suffering.175 They will therefore attempt to work with
survivors to articulate goals for a process that are consonant with TJ’s social
and political values176—recognizing, however, that sometimes honoring
survivor desires (for revenge, for example) may mean jettisoning a process.177
172
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Likewise, facilitators grapple with how to right-size reparations: “if you are
working hard to be accountable, and then you get kicked out of your home,
your community, you don’t have your basic needs met, those are pretty hard
conditions under which to lean in and do the work of accountability.”
Participants must therefore deliberate about the kinds of consequences that
can actually facilitate steps towards transformation: “We are under practiced
at this. And we are under skilled at this.”178
Perhaps an even more vexing challenge, in nearly every training I
attended, participants grapple with how to address recalcitrant aggressors.
“This is one of the biggest questions that we get in the work,” Hassan
reflects, “how do we hold someone accountable who’s not admitting that
they’ve done harm?”179 Facilitators are encouraged to anticipate “resistance
to accountability” at the outset of a process.180 Strategies to engage
resistance include using existing relationships and networks of connection,
care, and leverage to influence people who cause harm, and even using
pressure or force if needed to prevent further violence.181 But, as community
accountability processes move toward self-reflection, responsibility, and
acts of repair, they do so, if at all, through voluntary cooperation.182
This insistence upon voluntarism is as pragmatic as it is normative.
Self-fashioning, by its nature, rarely happens via mandate. But as a world
making project, TJ also aims to reduce hierarchy and coercion in social
relations. “[W]e’re not actually the state,” Hassan stresses.183 Nor will TJ
practitioners mimic its forms and functions: “we’re not going to be
monitoring people and following people around.”184 Indeed, facilitators
explain that ideally they do not want to hold people accountable at all
(“that’s our state”).185 The utopic vision instead is supporting people so they
can “proactively take accountability for themselves.”186
always going to be feeling as though it’s ‘not working’ because it’s not doing the thing that you really
would like.” KABA, ’TIL WE FREE US, supra note 148, at 251.
178
Perez-Darby, supra note 167, at 1:25:14. There are, of course, many similar debates among
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But, as readers may have already anticipated, some TJ tools and
concepts—responsibility, agency—resonate deeply with liberalism, indeed,
even with American ideals of bootstrapping individualism. Believing that
“one’s only going to take accountability . . . [that] it’s up to them” can sound
“individualistic,” Kim acknowledges.187 The challenge for TJ facilitators is
therefore to help people desire their own transformation by making
accountability something that happens within communities—that is, through
the process of encountering the kinds of social relations, interdependences,
and support systems that would enable harmers to want to ask: what do
others need from me?188
This question, in turn, requires facilitators to define “community” with
a great deal of specificity—and neither as a locality nor as an abstract group
of people presumed to share values. Organizers know well that through
informal social relationships, people can reproduce all the pathologies and
inequalities that they see as endemic in state institutions (“just because you
didn’t call the cops doesn’t mean [what you did is] revolutionary”).189 TJ
organizers therefore rely on “community” defined as a process, colloquially
called podmapping. People are encouraged to identify who they would turn
to if they enact or experience violence, harm, or abuse and need advice, help,
resources, or support. And then to ask these people if they would agree to
join together into a “pod”—for example, an accountability pod or a support
pod. These pods may engage in skill-sharing and attend trainings, participate

187
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Kim explains that facilitators may tell people, “You do not have to say you are responsible to be
part of this” but then “quickly try to create those conditions so somebody would think it was in their
benefit to actually reflect and move towards change.” Id. at 1:26:56. See also CREATIVE INTERVENTIONS,
supra note 150, at § 4.F2 (“What we mean by benefit is that [the person doing harm] can have better and
more meaningful relationships, they can live better lives, they can create respect and healthiness rather
than abuse and harm.”). I should add: practitioners, of course, do not believe that everyone is ready for
voluntary processes. As Jerry Tello reflects:

I’ve had men that are so wounded that I’ve had to take them out of the home because
it wasn’t safe for them to go back there. . . . [B]ecause of their addiction, because of
their woundedness . . . I could feel that spirit. . . . So there are ways of doing this, we
have to have spaces that are not based on incarceration . . . but also make sure [of the]
safety [of] the community.
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in accountability processes, and perhaps convene a few times a year to
recommit or break up with this endeavor.190
Podmapping makes transformative justice both ongoing and
workmanlike: “Gone were the fantasies of a giant, magical ‘community
response.’”191 It turns out, Mingus reflects, “[b]uilding [political] analysis
was much easier than building the relationship and trust required for one’s
pod.”192 Hence podmapping also helps to broaden TJ from a process
intelligible within social movements to one practiced concretely within
families and neighborhoods. TJ practitioners ask people who they would
turn to if violence happened, and then build analysis and practice “where
there is already authentic relationships and trust.”193
Building a movement through one’s families and networks is one way
that TJ practitioners envision they could produce scale through repetition
(“if everybody has, let’s say, two to six people in their pod, and then all those
people have two to six people in their pod . . . that, to me, is a concrete way
of how community gets built”).194 But organizers also express ambivalence
about how far TJ can or should travel, even if it has broad-based support and
ample resources. As Mingus stresses, organizers crafted tools and models
“in the fires of our intimate networks of our communities”—not tools
designed to respond to state and institutional violence.195 Some organizers
therefore offer restorative justice as a bridge to engage state institutions.196
Some suggest that one could build restorative, non-punitive processes in
schools, courts, or workplaces—provided these processes bring existing
systems closer to abolitionist ideals by producing less policing and
incarceration and not policing and incarceration in gentler, more
legitimating forms.197 Transformative justice, however, is a prefigurative
practice that organizers argue must be kept “away from the state.”198
Through sharing skills and gifting facilitation—and through meeting the
immediate needs of survivors and people who cause harm—participants in
190
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TJ live in the present the world they wish to build, even as it is not yet
possible to know what that this world will look like apart from conscious,
collective, and often hyper-local practices.
B. A Rebirth for ADR?
Transformative justice recalls the radical left turn to informal justice in
the 1970s and 1980s.199 As we have seen, in the 1980s and 1990s, left
sociolegal scholars responded to utopian projects for informal justice by
asking this overarching question: “what capacity does popular justice have
to promote the forms of social transformation and the reallocations of power
which it envisions?”200 As we have also seen, the sociolegal literature
established that there are no acontextual or general answers. There is nothing
intrinsic to teaching anti-state dispute practices that will ensure left,
progressive politics. As TJ organizers themselves know well, anti-state
dispute practices are always vulnerable to reconfigurations when they
encounter state law and ordering;201 to complex translations across a political
spectrum; to fading away.
I have previously traced how a version of restorative justice—one meant
to temper, not to replace, the existing carceral system—now enjoys growing
support among Republican policymakers, evangelical conservative
Christians, and libertarian think tanks and organizations funded by the Charles
Koch Foundation. Like TJ organizers, these reformers aim to cultivate within
Americans particular moral beliefs such as self-accountability, forgiveness,
and mutual aid. Through teaching people to develop relational capacities, the
idea (quite explicitly) is to generate forms of social cohesion and care needed
to shrink both the penal and the social state.202 Or to put this another way,
today, it is not simply ADR proponents, but people understood by some
ADR proponents as engaged in undesirable (“defund”) left-wing,
confrontational, anti-capitalist politics and people engaged in right-wing
politics for radical forms of “market freedom” who are now all practicing
199
Even as TJ also reflects today’s new social movement ethos steeped in processual and horizontal
organizing. See, e.g., DAY, supra note 170, at 91–126.
200
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STUD. 161, 162 (1992).
201
This is how some TJ organizers understand the fate of early radical impulses in the restorative
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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SECTORS 4 (2007), http://relationshipanarchy.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/
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and teaching conflict transformation, accountability, and apology from
deeply opposing normative positions.203
This left-right convergence reveals the contingent nature of ADR
techniques and values—indeed, it pushes ADR scholars, from the bottom
up, to reflect upon the politics of the discipline in a moment when we are
called to account for the future of the field. But I also think today’s resurgence
of anti-state dispute practices presents an opportunity for the field to reengage
a set of critical, historical, and empirical questions about how alternative
imaginaries are produced within and against law and capitalism—questions
that evaporated during ADR’s centrist decades of institutionalization.
In the 1980s, when sociolegal scholars converged on studying informal
dispute processing, they were building a critical empirical methodology that
aimed “to invert what is central so that the marginal, invisible, or unheard
becomes a voice and a focus.”204 As a field in American legal education, this
was ADR’s path not taken. As a field devoted to informal and alternative
dispute resolution, its guiding inquiry could have been about how to stand
aside from studying and trying to change the center directly. That is, about
how to stand aside from studying state legal institutions and the relentless
gap between design and implementation to focus instead on how people,
lacking access to the state and capital, “come to terms with and often resist
the penetration of official legal norms as they construct their own local
universe of legal values and behavior.”205 Efforts, Silbey and Sarat argued,
that will produce “instances that both confirm and contradict the dominant
discourse” and crucially “that will require us to reimagine the discourse in a
different way.”206
In the spirit of reviving this sociolegal perspective, let me suggest that
mediation is an especially useful concept to see what people do when they
wish to supplement cracks in the system. This is because mediation, as Carol
Greenhouse argues, “represents something of a residual category,” one that
analysts sometime define against formal adjudication and other times against
violent self-help.207 The usefulness of the category, she therefore ventures,
is that it enables analysts to study multiple social orders simultaneously.208
Allow me to elaborate. Rather than describe mediation as a process
internal to a group, Greenhouse suggests that mediation “by its very nature
draws our attention not only to intra-group relations, but also to intergroup
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relations.” She borrows Sally Falk Moore’s concept of a semi-autonomous
social field, which is a community defined “by a processual characteristic, the
fact that it can generate rules and coerce or induce compliance,” but whose
rules and norms almost always also interact with the rules and norms of a
dominant and typically state-based system.210 And Greenhouse argues that to
study mediation, especially when it is understood as a response to the problem
of maintaining social order, “[t]he nature of the links between one
semi-autonomous social field and another is of the utmost importance.”211
Analysts can pay attention to links—that is, to how mediators and
participants construct connections and boundaries between social fields and
between intra-group and intergroup relations—by asking the following
kinds of questions: Where does a mediator’s source of authority come from
and how does she garner influence or coercive power? Does the mediator
use explicit norms that invoke abstract rules that everyone recognizes as
authoritative and that therefore relate a conflict to “a social order beyond and
above (and including) the participants”?212 Or does she use implicit norms,
that is, norms expressed as personal statements where “the relevant social
field is the relationships in terms of which they are expressed”?213 And how
does the mediator derive her legitimacy? Is it derived from her relationships
with parties—hence inclusive mediation? Or, instead, is there “an
institutionalised system of statuses” that authorizes her participation—i.e.,
exclusive mediation?214
From this perspective, mediation is not necessarily an alternative to the
state, although it can be. But, crucially, mediation is always a vector, pointing
to and co-constitutive with the social order beyond it. In other words, it is a
category that is emergent from the social order and that simultaneously insists
that this order needs to be played with, inverted, invoked, evaded,
transgressed, changed, perhaps abolished. Indeed, I think the key insight to
take from Greenhouse is that mediation is analytically richest when it is
understood as a practice where people on the ground point to gaps—to how
the dominant social order is failing to provide the forms of justice, safety,
relationality, and security they are seeking.215 And mediation is likewise
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analytically most anemic when it is defined as a formulaic, institutionalized
practice that takes place primarily in the shadow of state legality.
Readers can thus see why I have argued that transformative justice, like
the dispute resolution practices CVICT introduced into Nepali villages, is an
especially robust example of mediation. Let me briefly redescribe TJ using
Greenhouse’s categories. TJ organizers aim to establish as much autonomy
and as few linkages to the dominant social order as possible. They offer
practices of conflict intervention that aim purposefully to orient people away
from a vertical system topped by police and prosecutors and instead towards
horizontal interpersonal relations. As such, a facilitator’s source of
legitimacy must be relational, and her knowledge must be local. To be sure,
TJ facilitators draw on explicit, as well as implicit, norms. But here explicit
norms reflect a consensus within a social movement—for example, shared
understandings of affirmative consent and sexual harm that are often far
broader than those encoded in official law.216 These explicit norms orient
participants to authoritative political understandings that transcend and also
challenge, rather than legitimate, state-centered law. TJ facilitators will not,
moreover, draw on formalized institutional hierarchies for legitimacy. Nor
will they draw on any resources from these hierarchies—or at least not as a
strategy deployed to influence a voluntary process.217 TJ, as far as possible,
is inclusive mediation.
The specific ways in which TJ practitioners labor to create autonomy and
minimize linkages between social fields, in turn, limit how they can conceive of
a scale-making project. As we have seen, TJ practitioners do not want to create
an overarching system of conflict management for the nation to practice as a
whole. Features such as deprofessionalization, decommodification, local
knowledge, podmapping, and voluntarism all represent efforts by TJ organizers
to keep their social fields distinct. These delineations (which for some readers,
I recognize, will render the practice marginal) are understood precisely as a
means of building social movement power. The point of enacting conceptual
(and material) separation after all is to help oppressed communities resist the
dominant social order being imposed upon them.
Many questions follow: Will TJ be able to provide a sustainable
alternative to state criminal law, notwithstanding (or because of) its refusal
216
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of institutionalization and its rejection of elite and expert rule? And could
the movement produce different forms of social change by helping to spur
the creation of more relational and restorative state,218 where state power is
used to build an economy based on cooperation?219 Or might TJ processes
become entangled in internal conflicts and hierarchies when norms about
what counts as sexual (and other forms of) harm are not shared?220 My point
here is simply that these are the kinds of analytical and empirical questions
about power and social transformation that the field of ADR could claim by
understanding transformative justice—and, for that matter, a range of
relational conflict processes outside of state adjudication—as mediation.
Or to put this argument another way: this Article is an effort to recover
mediation less as an institution or set of procedures than as a way of framing
a research question.221 By rejecting the idea that mediation is no more and
no less than a set of formal procedural practices and the skills that broadly
support these practices—and by recognizing mediation’s analytical,
political, and individual value to stem from how facilitators and participants
traverse and delineate social orders—ADR scholars have a particular
vantage point to reveal what people in conflict do when the dominant order
fails them and hence also to think about the transformative potential of new
practices of dispute resolution.
Inversely, as reformers and scholars offer theories and proposals for
egalitarian structural change, ADR scholars have a particular, if still
underdeveloped and underutilized, perspective to link macro and micro
levels of analysis—namely, by asking about the ordinary and yet difficult
practices of negotiation, relationship-building, and dispute resolution that
invariably enable (and constrain) such proposals. Indeed, a virtue of thinking
with mediation is that it allows ADR scholars to build “weak theory”—that
is, “theory that ‘refuses to know too much’ about what is or isn’t possible”
because it constantly draws attention to “the hard, messy and humble work
of building transformative relationships, organizations, and movements” on
the ground.222
This research perspective may, in turn, have some broader implications
for ADR practice and teaching. I will offer three provisional suggestions.
218
See, e.g., RESTORATIVE AND RESPONSIVE HUMAN SERVICES (Gale Buford, John Braithwaite
and Valerie Braithwaite eds., 2019); MARTHA MINOW, WHEN SHOULD LAW FORGIVE? (2019).
219
See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, For Coöperation and the Abolition of Capital, Or, How to Get
Beyond Our Extractive Punitive Society and Achieve a Just Society (Columbia L. Sch. Pub. L. Working
Paper, Paper No. 14-672, 2020), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2708.
220
See, e.g., Cohen, Globalization, supra note 1, at 337–51, for examples of how CVICT mediation
provided Nepali villagers with methods to use against the social and political hierarchies that oppress
them and to reconfigure local relationships and prioritize rights and values in the service of ends that
were not always predictable nor always progressive.
221
Moore, supra note 210, at 742.
222
Ethan Miller, Community Economy: Ontology, Ethics, and Politics for Radically Democratic
Economic Organizing, 25 RETHINKING MARXISM 518, 526 (2013) (reading J.K. Gibson-Graham).
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First, thinking of transformative justice as a kind of mediation—as a kind of
ADR—suggests that ADR practice may be of use in a wider array of
institutional and political settings than it has been applied so far. It also
suggests that the public-private distinction that ADR scholars once relied
upon may no longer hold as a guide to what kinds of cases belong in informal
forums. In the 1980s, ADR proponents produced a consensus in response to
their Fissian critics: “When an authoritative ruling is necessary, . . . the
courts must adjudicate and provide clear guidance for all: Racial
discrimination is wrong; oppressive prison conditions are intolerable in a
decently humane society.”223 Or William Ury, Jeanne Brett, and Stephen
Goldberg: “Although reconciling interests is generally less costly than
determining rights, only adjudication can authoritatively resolve questions
of public importance.”224 As I suggested above, many early ADR proponents
never relinquished their faith in formal legality to regulate and redress social
wrongs and inequalities.
Today, however, TJ organizers are mobilizing from a very different
premise (and political and social context): to fight racial discrimination and
oppressive prison conditions, they argue that people should reclaim control
over the resolution of questions of public importance, even those that
involve interpersonal and sexual violence. And although TJ organizers do
not themselves wish to design large-scale popular dispute resolution
institutions, their bold embrace of difficult cases invites ADR scholars to
think more critically about the scope and limits of informal justice—to think
again about how to balance the individual protections offered by formal
legality against the opportunities for civic and political engagement offered
through popular participation. Indeed, it suggests that ADR scholars and
practitioners could rethink when and how what John Braithwaite calls the
“justice of the law” should be infused and constrained by the “justice of the
people”225 (a question elaborated in the civil context in literature on
democratic experimentalism).226
223
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory
Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 500 (1985).
224
WILLIAM L. URY, JEANNE M. BRETT & STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG, GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED:
DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT 17 (1988). See also Jethro K. Lieberman & James
F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 433 (1986)
(“One short answer to Fiss is that most ADR proponents make no claim for shunting all, or even most,
litigation into alternative forums.”).
225
John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and De-Professionalization, 13 GOOD SOC’Y 28, 30–31
(2004) [hereinafter Braithwaite, De-Professionalization].
226
See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Epilogue: Accountability Without Sovereignty,
in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 395, 395 (Gráinne de Búrca & Joanne Scott
eds., 2006); Joanne Scott & Susan P. Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Rethinking the Judicial Role in New
Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EUROPEAN L. 565, 565 (2007); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The
Lawyer’s Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 347, 347 (2005).
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Second, paying attention to how social movements are creating their
own relational forms of negotiation and dispute processing presents an
opportunity for ADR scholars and practitioners to revitalize their work in
this normative tradition. Today, ADR interventions typically assist
disputants to bargain in the shadow of the law and to discover opportunities
for efficiency maximization. And yet key ADR texts have also aimed to
foster a different paradigm: that is, a deep “alternative to detachment,
separation, adversarial modes of relating.”227 But, as I suggested above,
ADR’s relational skills and practices are themselves politically
indeterminate. Perhaps today’s resurgence of interest in nonstate dispute
resolution on both the political left and right will spur a new generation of
ADR scholars to build relational skills and capacities alongside building
experimental organizing visions of the political, economic, and social order
that they intend these skills to disrupt or sustain.228 One of the field’s early
twentieth century founders, Mary Parker Follett, advanced precisely this
ambition. She originated the field-defining concept of integration—but
through a body of political writings that made clear that she did not think
there could be integrative negotiations in a workplace where labor and
capital did not come meaningfully to share power.229
And finally: could re-envisioning what mediation “is” reshape some ADR
teaching? I would not suggest that ADR teachers take TJ—designed as a
counter-hegemonic practice of deprofessionalization and decommodification—and
attempt to translate it into its own course in legal education. But, in a moment
when scholars and advocates are arguing that “[w]e can use the power of
communities and government to make our cities safer without relying on
police, courts, and prisons,”230 I would suggest that ADR courses should
explicate for students how different practices of conflict and conflict
intervention presuppose very different relationships to the state and
capitalism. And I would likewise suggest that ADR courses could therefore
teach relational skills and capacities that are explicitly connected to the
diverse normative political theories that shape them. From this perspective,
one potential aim of ADR could be to help students develop relational skills
as part of broader deliberations about how and why to use these skills to
227
Gary Friedman & Peter Gabel, When Law Is the Elephant in the Room, 18 TIKKUN 40, 41 (2003).
See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, Problem Solving, supra note 123; FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 124; STONE,
PATTON & HEEN, supra note 124; ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF
MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994); JOHN
WINSLADE & GERALD MONK, NARRATIVE MEDIATION: A NEW APPROACH TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION
(2000).
228
For recent examples, see Andrew B. Mamo, Three Ways of Looking at Dispute Resolution, 54
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1399 (2019); Daniel Del Gobbo, Feminism in Conversation: Campus Sexual
Violence and the Negotiation from Within, 53 UBC L. REV. 591 (2021).
229
Cohen, Labor Theory, supra note 13.
230
VITALE, supra note 133, at 22; TONY PLATT, BEYOND THESE WALLS: RETHINKING CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 253 (2018).
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resist—or attempt to change and transform—externally imposed state power
in their own relationships and communities.231
CONCLUSION
In 1977, Norwegian criminologist Nils Christie published an essay that
elaborated the basic values and aspirations that would coalesce first as
restorative and then transformative justice. Christie argued that advanced
industrialized states deprive citizens of a critical resource—conflicts—which
citizens rightfully “own” and should be entitled to use to elaborate their own
norms and social relationships.232 He extensively criticized professional,
statist forms of expertise and called instead for lay-oriented community moots
that would stage intensely personalized and dialogic encounters between
victims and offenders.233
Christie’s essay remains famous to this day. Less remembered, however,
is how he ended it. Christie linked his plea for the mass democratization of
crime control systems to radically democratic theories of education (e.g.,
Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1970)) and of the economy (e.g.,
Schumacher, Small is Beautiful (1973)) and criticism of the concept Gross
National Product. And then he turned to the role of universities. “More schools
for more lawyers, social workers, sociologists, criminologists,” he
lamented.234 “While I am talking deprofessionalisation, we are increasing the
capacity to be able to fill up the whole world with them.”235 Hence, he asked:
“what about the universities in this picture?” 236 “The answer,” he surmised:
[H]as probably to be the old one: universities have to reemphasise the old tasks of understanding and of criticising. But
the task of training professionals ought to be looked into with
renewed scepticism. Let us re-establish the credibility of
encounters between critical human beings: low-paid, highly
regarded, but with no extra power—outside the weight of their
good ideas. That is as it ought to be. 237
In 1977, when Christie offered this humble vision he did not then need to
confront a very different attack on scientific expertise and professional social
planning alongside an attack on state-sponsored education and
intellectualism—attacks introduced and entrenched in American popular
231
Cf. Jennifer W. Reynolds, The Activist Plus: Dispute Systems Design and Social Activism, 13 U.
ST. THOMAS L.J. 334, 352–53 (2017).
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233
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Id. at 14.
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consciousness by prominent neoliberal thinkers (think: Frederick Hayek,
James Buchanan, Milton Friedman).238 Today, in part for this reason, I do not
think it is desirable, let alone plausible, to call for deprofessionalization in
legal education.
This Article has, however, suggested that ADR is today increasingly
understood as a field devoted to professional skills and industry best
practices apart from “the old tasks of understanding and of criticising”—a
programmatic orientation that no longer appears to suffice to sustain ADR
as a necessary and vibrant scholarly field in legal education.239 And yet this
Article has also ventured that the demands of the political present suggest
that, perhaps more than ever, law students interested in dispute practices
need critical encounters with professionalisms that are oriented around
theories of nondomination, direct democracy, and political-economic
change.240 And that ADR can therefore be a foundational and critical
steppingstone for radical thinking.
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